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Attention K Mart Shoppers: In K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. the Supreme
Court Granted District Courts
Jurisdiction in Gray Market
Disputes
by THOMAS H. WOLFE*
Introduction
In 1984, The Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American
Trademarks (COPIAT) brought an action against the United
States for declaratory and injunctive relief.' Plaintiffs claimed
that the Customs Service regulations were inconsistent with
the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946,2
and further that plaintiffs had suffered damage "from the im-
portation and sale in this country of products known as di-
verted, gray market, or parallel goods."' 3 A gray market good is
defined as a "foreign-manufactured good bearing a valid United
States trademark, which is imported without the consent of the
U.S. trademark owner."
4
COPIAT asserted that the tariff and trademark acts barred
the importation of "goods bearing trademarks identical to their
own."'5 The Customs Service regulations, however, "permit the
* B.S., Oklahoma State University; May 1989 J.D. candidate.
1. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States
[COPIAT], 598 F. Supp. 844,846 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd
in part on other grounds sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 950 (1988),
off'd in part and rev'd in part, 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). COPIAT is an American trade
association of trademark owners. They were joined by two members of the associa-
tion, Cartier, Inc. and Charles of the Ritz Group, Ltd.
2. 598 F. Supp at 846.
3. Id.
4. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 950, 954 (1988).
5. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 904. The two statutes are § 526(a) of the Tariff Act of
1930, 19 U.S.C. § 526 (1982), and § 42 of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1124 (1982). Section 42 issues were not addressed by the courts.
Section 526 states:
(a) Importation prohibited. Except as provided in subsection (d) of this sec-
tion, it shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of
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importation of such goods, inter alia, if the American and for-
eign trademarks are owned by the same or affiliated entities or
if the American owner has authorized the foreign entity to use
the trademark."'
Defendants, the United States and intervenors 47th Street
Photo, Inc. and K Mart Corporation, contended that "the chal-
lenged regulations are a correct application of the trademark
statutes and that the legislative history demonstrates that it
was not the intention of Congress to prohibit importation of di-
verted goods."7 47th Street Photo also contended "that the
Court of International Trade (CIT) has exclusive jurisdiction
over [COPIAT's] claims under section 526 of the Tariff Act
.... ,, Prior to the Customs Court Act of 1980,' the jurisdiction
foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package,
wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a cor-
poration or association created or organized within the United States, and
registered in the Patent Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the
United States, under the provisions of sections 81 to 109 of Title 15, and if a
copy of the certificate of registration of such trademark is filed with the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, in the manner provided in section 27 of such Act,
unless written consent of the owner of such trade-mark is produced at the
time of making entry.
6. 790 F.2d at 904, citing 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1985), which states:
Restrictions on importation of articles bearing recorded trademarks and
trade names:
(a) Copying or simulating marks or names. Articles of foreign or domes-
tic manufacture bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded
trademark or trade name shall be denied entry and are subject to forfeiture
as prohibited importations. A "copying or simulating" mark or name is an
actual counterfeit of the recorded mark or name or is one which so resembles
it as to be likely to cause the public to associate the copying or simulating
mark with the recorded mark or name.
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark iden-
tical with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a cor-
poration or association created or organized within the United States are
subject to seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned
by the same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or tradename owners are par-
ent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common own-
ership or control.
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or
trade name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner.
Id (emphasis in original).
7. COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 850.
8. Id. at 847.
9. Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (found in portions of Titles 19 and 28).
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of the Customs Court (predecessor of the Court of Interna-
tional Trade) "was limited to review of Customs Service denials
of protests concerning exclusion of merchandise, classification,
and valuation of imports."'10 In 1980, however, the Congress ad-
ded section 1581(i), which provided residual jurisdiction for the
court in cases where the Government is a party."'
The substantive and jurisdictional issues were fully explored
by both the trial and appellate courts of the District of Colum-
bia District and four other courts. 2 The findings varied widely,
and the appellate courts often took contradictory positions.'
3
On December 6, 1986 the Supreme Court consolidated the
COPIAT case with two private suits, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., and 47th Street Photo v. COPIAT, and granted certiorari.
The jurisdictional issue was decided separately on March 7,
1988 in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.14 The substantive issue
was returned to the calendar for reargument.
10. Kennedy, Jurisdictional Conflicts in Gray Market Goods Litigation: The Fail-
ure of the Customs Court Act of 1980, 9 Hous J. INT'L L. 9 (1986).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(1), states:
(i) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of International
Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this section and subject to the exception set
forth in subsection (j) of this section, the Court of International Trade shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the United
States, its agencies, or it officers, that arises out of any law of the United
States providing for-
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for
reasons other than the raising of revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of mer-
chandise for reasons other than the protection of the public health or
safety, or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to matters referred to in
paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection and subsections (a)-(h) of this
section.
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1982).
12. COPLAT, 598 F. Supp. 844,846 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd 790 F.2d 903, 904 (D.C. Cir.
1986). The other four courts are: Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986), 585 F. Supp. 1419 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984),
593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984); Olympus Corporation v. United States, 627 F.
Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (unpublished opinion), 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986).
13. In COPIAT the District of Columbia Circuit found that jurisdiction properly
lies with the district courts, and the Customs Service regulations were an improper
interpretation of section 526. The Federal Circuit, in Vivitar, found that the Court of
International Trade properly had jurisdiction, and upheld the regulation. The Olym-
pus court agreed that the district courts had jurisdiction, but, contrary to COPIAT,
found the regulations valid.
14. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 950 (1988), sub nora. COPLAT, 790 F.2d
903 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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The purpose of this Note is to review the jurisdictional argu-
ments presented in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. The Note
first provides a survey of the lower courts' decisions. Next, it
describes the jurisdictional findings of the Supreme Court. Fi-
nally, it criticizes the Court's decision and suggests an alternate




A. Vivitar Corp. v. United States'1
1. The Court of International Trade
In Vivitar, plaintiff Vivitar had licensed foreign manufactur-
ers to use the Vivitar trademark on the photographic equip-
ment they manufactured. Vivitar claimed that third parties
imported this equipment without its authorization.
17
The defendant, the United States, moved to dismiss the ac-
tion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,1'8 arguing that this
was a trademark case and, therefore, must be determined by
the district courts, not the CIT.'9 The court took exception to
both assertions, observing that not all trademark issues must be
decided by the district courts.20 It conceded that the district
courts generally have trademark jurisdiction; however, it
would not concede its own lack of jurisdiction over interna-
tional trade matters involving trademark issues.'
In order to decide this issue, the court had to determine
whether an international trade or a trademark dispute existed.
It turned to the test used by the CIT in Schaper Manufacturing
15. See supra note 11.
16. 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
17. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 1419 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
18. Id. at 1422.
19. Id. The government contended that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1976), which grants
jurisdiction to the U.S. district courts over civil actions relating to trademarks, was
controlling. Since the jurisdiction of the CIT was exclusive, and not concurrent, the
district courts were the proper forum.
Section 1338(a) states: "(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protec-
tion, copyrights and trade-marks. Such Jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of
the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)
(1982).
20. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1422 (citations omitted).
21. Id
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Co. v. Regan.22 In that case, the CIT looked to the gravamen of
the complaint to determine whether the "thrust of the griev-
ance alleged and the relief sought by the plaintiff relates to the
regulations promulgated by customs and their administration
and enforcement.... , Vivitar's complaint was not that a
third party had violated its trademark right; "rather the central
issue in [Vivitar was] the regulation of international trade in
goods bearing genuine trademarks ....
The Vivitar court stated that the right to regulate genuine
trademark goods is "uniquely a concern of international trade
law' 25 and such goods are not otherwise restricted. 6 The court
proceeded to explain that its mandate is to provide "a uniform
national interpretation '' 7 of international trade law and Cus-
toms Service regulations. According to the court, such a uni-
form national interpretation is necessary to provide "a degree
of certainty to those involved in complex international trade
transactions. ' ' 2s The court noted that exclusive jurisdiction
over international trade litigation would help to avoid "conflict-
ing interpretations of international trade law"' 9 and to reduce
confusion in the genuine trademark trade industry.3 Also, the
court would be able to apply its particular expertise in trade
matters to the issue.31 Based on these considerations, the court
decided that Vivitar was an international trade action.
This alone did not give the court jurisdiction, however.32
Next, the Vivitar court had to determine whether the particu-
22. 566 F. Supp. 894 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). "Schaper arose out of a dispute con-
cerning a bond submitted by an American copyright holder during the pendency of a
copyright infringement action against an importer in the district court." Vivitar, 585
F. Supp. at 1422.
23. Schaper, 566 F. Supp. at 896.
24. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1423.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See H.R. REP. No. 1235,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 20 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3729, 3731. The CIT's basic purpose is to provide "a
comprehensive system of judicial review of civil actions arising from import transac-
tions, utilizing the specialized expertise of the [CIT ... [to] ensure. . . uniformity in
the judicial decisionmaking process." Id.
28. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1423.
29. Id.
30. Contra Olympus v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 318 (2d Cir. 1986). The court
called this issue a trademark or antitrust issue, and not an international trade issue.
Therefore, a CIT decision is not required and would not impair the congressional
mandate for uniformity in international trade decisions. Id.
31. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1423.
32. Id.
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lar issue at stake fell directly within its jurisdiction. The plain-
tiff argued that the right to a hearing before the court to
protest any exclusion of merchandise under section 526(a) and
(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 would give the court jurisdiction
"pursuant to section 1581(i)(4) to consider claims arising out of
Customs Service regulations governing the administration and
enforcement of exclusions ....
The plaintiff asserted that Congress granted the CIT broad
residual jurisdiction over all civil actions arising from interna-
tional trade laws in section 1581(i).34 Section 1581(i) specifi-
cally defines the areas of residual jurisdiction to include all
categories mentioned in 1581(i)(1)-(3) and jurisdiction over the
administration and enforcement of the subject matter found
in 1581(a)-(h) and (i)(1)-(3).-" The court, agreeing in part,
found jurisdiction in Vivitar through a combination of section
1581(a) and section 1581(i)(4), and, separately under section
1581(i)(3).36
Vivitar's substantive claim was that the Government violated
section 526(a) and (b) in failing to exclude genuine trademark
goods duly registered by an American citizen or other entity.'
Under "normal" section 1581(a) procedure, an importing party
may file a protest of an exclusion. If the protest is denied, the
matter may be brought before the CIT.' In Vivitar, however,
there was no exclusion; instead, the Customs Service had ad-
mitted genuine trademark goods.39 Section 1514 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, which defines actions open to protest, allows only
33. Id. at 1424. Vivitar presented two arguments. In one argument not considered
by the court, the CIT would have jurisdiction because § 526(a) and (b) were laws relat-
ing to "revenue from imports within the meaning of § 1581(i)(1), and therefore under
§ 1581(1)(4) this court has jurisdiction over any claim arising out of the administration
and enforcement of § 526(a) and (b)." Id. The court rejected this argument in foot-
note 9. The mere fact that there is a law which may effect importation or exclusion
does not qualify the law as relating to revenues from imports. To follow such logic
would make the rest of § 1581(1) meaningless. Id.
34. Id H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 34 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3729, 3745. See Sacilor Acieries et Laminoirs de
Lorraine v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 1020 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
35. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1424. See supra note 5.
36. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1427. See supra note 11. § 1581(a) states: "[t]he Court
of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced
to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section 1515 of the Tariff
Act of 1930."
37. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1421. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982). See supra note 5.
38. See supra note 36.
39. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1424.
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protests of limited actions, including exclusions, but not
admissions.40
Lacking direct section 1581(a) jurisdiction, the court turned
to section 1581(i)(4), which gives exclusive jurisdiction for mat-
ters arising out of the administration and enforcement of the
subject matter of 1581(a). 4' The court reasoned that the subject
matter of section 1581(a) parallels that of sections 1514 and 1515
of the Tariff Act regarding the right to protest exclusions and
the right of appeal to the CIT for denial of protest. 2 "Thus,
section 1581(i)(4) is a residual independent jurisdictional basis
for litigating Customs Service administration and enforcement
of the substantive matter that may be the subject of a protest,
but where the protest remedy is inappropriate or unavaila-
ble."4  A protest is inappropriate under section 1581(a)." Sec-
tion 1581(i)(4), however, grants residual jurisdiction. 5
The court decided that jurisdiction could be found under sec-
tion 1581(i)(4), despite two restraints on the section. First, in
the legislative report that accompanied the 1980 Act, Congress
required that this section could not create new causes of ac-
tion.4 The court found that this section only delineated the ju-
risdiction of the CIT and the district courts.47 Second, section
1581(i) could not be used to circumvent the requirements of the
protest procedure." This restraint was not relevant since Viv-
itar did not have a right to protest.49
One concern of the court was the administrative and enforce-
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(4) (1982) states:
Finality of decisions; return of papers .... [D]ecisions of the appropriate
customs officer, including the legality of all orders and findings entering into
the same, as to ...
(4) the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery or a demand for
redelivery to customs custody under any provision of the customs laws, ex-
cept a determination appealable under section 337 of this title [19 U.S.C.
§ 1337].
41. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1424.
42. Id at 1424-25.
43. Id at 1425.
44. Id. at 1424.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1425. See H.R. REP. No. 1235,96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 33 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3729, 3745. See also Carlingswitch, Inc. v.
United States, 560 F. Supp. 46 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), qff'd, 720 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
47. 585 F. Supp. at 1425.
48. Id See United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 683 F.2d 399 (Fed.
Cir. 1982).
49. 585 F. Supp. at 1425.
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ment nature of sections 1514 and 1515 of the Tariff Act. The
court stated that since cases arising from sections 1514 and 1515
are always in the nature of "administration and enforcement"
(filing, review, and denial of protests), a narrow reading of sec-
tion 1581(i)(4) would "essentially render it meaningless" and
duplicative.50 The court, citing United States v. Uniroyal,"'
pointed out that section 1581(i) has importance independent of
the other subsections: "[Slection 1581(i) may be invoked only
when no other remedy is available or the other remedies pro-
vided under other provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1581 are manifestly
inadequate."3 The court concluded that section 1581(i)(4) can-
not be limited to cases reviewing the administration and en-
forcement of the subject matters found in 1581(a).54
The second basis for jurisdiction found by the Vivitar court
was section 1581(i)(3), which refers to "embargoes and other
quantitative restrictions," and includes statutes that ban goods
for nonpublic health reasons:5
In effect, section 1581(i)(3) gives this court jurisdiction over
cases arising under the customs laws where the importation of
goods is limited to a specific quantity. This includes a statutory
limit of zero in the case of embargoes and statutes outlawing
the importation of certain merchandise. Section 1526(a) pro-
vides just such a statutory limit: it outlaws the importation of
all trademarked goods under certain circumstances.'
The court argued that this meaning is evident upon the face
of the statute, and in its legislative history.57 According to the
court, the limiting language concerning public health and
safety issues was intended to keep jurisdiction in the district
courts for two public health related acts.5 Legislative history
supported this statement.5 9 "Tihe Committee adopted a more
precise subsection (i) in an effort to remove any confusion over
50. Id at 1426.
51. 687 F.2d 467 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
52. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1426.
53. Uniroyal, 687 F.2d at 475.
54. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1426.
55. See supra note 11.
56. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1426.
57. Id. See supra note 5.
58. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1426. The court was referring specifically to the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1982), and the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1982).
59. H.R. REP. No. 1235,96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 47-48 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3729, 3759.
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the jurisdiction of- the [CIT] regarding this or similar issues."'
The court reasoned that since Congress explicitly restricted
the CIT's jurisdiction in only the public health areas, it "obvi-
ously intended section 1581(i)(3) to give this court jurisdiction
generally over statutes prohibiting importation of merchan-
dise."'" In the court's view, a different interpretation would
render the limiting language meaningless, a result which the
court could not justify.6 2
The final rationale given by the court was the basic principle
of statutory construction. "Since... Congress expressly elimi-
nated [from section 1581(i)(3)] one type of statute outlawing
imports, by inference Congress intended other statutes barring
imports to be included."63
2. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the
findings of the lower court." It noted that two recent district
court decisions expressly rejected the CIT's arguments,6 and
that jurisdiction for the Customs Court, and now the CIT, was
an exception to the federal question jurisdiction granted the
district courts.6 Therefore, it was proper to look to the CIT
first to determine whether an issue should be decided by that
court or a district court.67 Otherwise, the extremely broad
grant of power to the district courts would eclipse jurisdiction
in the CIT, and thwart Congress' intent to grant "exclusive ju-
risdiction over certain matters to the CIT."" In fact, the Cus-
toms Court Act of 1980 created more exceptions to district
court power, thereby expanding CIT's jurisdiction without cre-
60. Id. at 48.
61. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1427.
62. Id. (citing Dart Export Corp. v. United States, 43 C.C.P.A. 64, 74 (1956), cert
denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956)).
63. This is the doctrine of ecpressio unius est exclusio alterius. See United States
v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 510 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1975). The doctrine is in line
with the broad jurisdictional intent of Congress in § 1581(i).
64. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 474
U.S. 1055 (1986).
65. Id. at 1559. The two cases were: COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. 844, 846 (D.D.C. 1984),
and Olympus Corporation v. United States, 627 F. Supp, 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (unpub-
lished opinion).
66. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1559. See, e.g., Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396,
398-99 (2d Cir. 1977).
67. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1559.
68. Id, (emphasis in original).
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ating any new causes of action. 9
The court stated further that CIT jurisdiction should be de-
termined by focusing "solely on whether the claim falls within
the language and intent of the jurisdictional grant to the
CIT. ' 70 Prior to 1980 there was no doubt that jurisdiction over
section 526 claims properly belonged in the district courts.7
Yet, Congress' intent in the Customs Court Act was to consoli-
date in one court all claims against the government in interna-
tional trade matters.2
Additionally, the circuit court felt that if Vivitar Corp. had
raised any substantive trademark or unfair competition claims,
the CIT would not have had jurisdiction." Such a claim be-
tween private parties does not fall within section 1581 of the
1980 Act.7 4 But the court also felt that the question in Vivitar
of whether Customs regulations governing exclusion of goods
are valid is a "question to which the CIT can bring expertise." '75
Addressing the lower court's "corollary to protest jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)," the court agreed with the
defendant "that the exclusion of goods by reason of the trade-
mark thereon is not a matter which an importer may protest"'
as long as the dispute is between private parties. 77 The court
made clear that in matters involving disputes over trademarks
between private parties the district court is the proper forum.7"
However, if the issue is the validity of regulations or regulatory
procedures, the CIT, as properly decided below, has jurisdiction
69. Id. at 1560. See H.R. REP. No. 1235,96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 45 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3729, 3756. For example:
Subsection (d) of proposed § 1581 is a new jurisdictional grant of authority to
the Court of International Trade ... [It] transfers exclusive jurisdiction to
review a final determination of the Secretary of Labor refusing to certify
workers as eligible for adjustment assistance under the Trade Act of 1974
from the United States courts of appeals to the [CIT].
IS
70. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1560 (emphasis in original).
71. Id.
72. Id. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 33 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3729, 3745. "[The addition of § 1581(i)] granted the
court jurisdiction over those civil actions which arise directly out of an import transac-
tion and involve one of the many international trade laws." Id.
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under section 1581(a) and (i)(4).79
Finally, the court, without discussion, agreed with the lower
court that alternate jurisdiction is available through section
1581(i)(3) and/or (4).0
B. COPIA T v. United States
1. The District Court
When the District Court for the District of Columbia took up
the COPIAT case, the lower court decision in Vivitar had al-
ready been published.81 Intervenor-defendant, 47th Street
Photo, cited the decision in its motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.82
The court, however, rejected the motion, and held that the
district court had general federal question jurisdiction under
sections 1331 and 1338(a) of the United States Code, which spe-
cifically relate to trademark disputes." The court denied, with-
out discussion, that this case came within the purview of the
CIT's jurisdictional grant in section 1581.4
2. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reviewed
the case after the Federal Circuit handed down its Vivitar deci-
79. Id
80. Id. No explanation for this assertion is given outside of a citation to the use of
the word "embargo" in the legislative history of § 526. Referring to § 526, Senator
Kellogg said, "Mr. President, this is the first time I ever of in [sic] legislation that the
United States proposed to enforce the trademark laws by a prohibition and an em-
bargo against shipments." 62 CONG. REC. 11,603 (1922) (statement of Sen. Kellogg).
81. COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984).
82. Id. at 847. It also argued that the case be dismissed in order to avoid conflict-
ing decisions and for judicial and legal resource preservation reasons. Id
83. Id 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(b) (1982). See supra note 19. The court also consid-
ered jurisdiction under title 15, § 1124. It held that there is not specific jurisdiction
that arises from the Lanham Trademark Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1946) states in part:
No article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of
the [sic] any domestic manufacture, or manufacturer, or trader, or of any
manufacturer or trader located in any foreign country which, by treaty, con-
vention, or law affords similar privileges to citizens of the United States, or
which shall copy or simulate a trade-mark registered in accordance with the
provisions of this Act ... or shall bear a name or mark calculated to induce
the public to believe that the article is manufactured in the United States, or
that it is manufactured in any foreign country or locality other than the
country or locality in which it is in fact manufactured, shall be admitted to
entry at any customhouse of the United States ....
Id.
84. COPLAT, 598 F. Supp. at 847.
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sion. It defined the issue as being "whether actions of this
sort may properly be brought in federal district court or
whether they must in all cases be initiated in the Court of In-
ternational Trade, with appellate jurisdiction in the Federal
Circuit. '"88
Judge Silberman, speaking for the court, acknowledged, as
all courts had previously done, that without the Customs Court
Act of 1980, the district courts would definitely have jurisdic-
tion. 7 However, the court noted that the 1980 act, in particular
section 1581, expanded the jurisdiction of the CIT, and there-
fore restricted some jurisdictional power of district courts."8
The court also reviewed and rejected the arguments of the
Vivitar appellate decision. Reading the language of section
1581(a), the court concluded "that the matter referred to in sec-
tion 1581(a) is the denial of protests, or simply protests."' 9
However, since this was not a case of exclusion, but of admis-
sion, there was no basis for a protest.9°
The next question addressed by the court was whether this
reading of section 1581(i)(4) duplicates section 1581(a). Judge
Silberman stated that "whereas Section 1581(a) only provides
for jurisdiction over cases contesting the denial of a protest-in
other words, challenging the basis of the denial-Section
1581(i)(4) (as applied to Section 1581(a)) provides additional ju-
risdiction over cases challenging the procedures-that is, the
'administration and enforcement'-generally governing such
protests." 91
The court examined the merits of the argument for jurisdic-
tion based upon actions against federal government agencies re-
garding "embargoes or other quantitative restrictions" under
section 1581(i)(3).9 2 Again, the holding in Vivitar was re-
85. COPIAT, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
86. Id at 905.
87. Id
88. Id
89. Id at 906. In Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), the
court denied that this was an action arising from administration and enforcement of
protests "simply because it tangentially relates to the protest procedure." Id at 318.
Like the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in COPIAT, it restricted § 1581(a) to
protest only, "not of all issues that conceivably could arise in a protest action under a
hypothetical fact situation." Id
90. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 906.
91. Id (emphasis in original).
92. Id
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jected. 3 The court debated whether the definition used by Viv-
itar was in fact the one intended by the drafters of section 1581.
It inferred Congress' intent from the structure of section
1581(i)(1), relating to "revenue from imports or tonnage," and
(i)(2), relating to "tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the im-
portation of merchandise .... ,,'4 The court rejected the Vivitar
court's definition as too broad, stating that "the structure of the
statute belies any expansive reading of the term 'embargo.' ",o5
The court felt that "embargo" should be read to refer to "trade
policy, the sort of measures that have traditionally limited the
importation of shoes, textiles, automobiles, and the like."'
The court, in its conclusion, acknowledged Congress' intent
in the Customs Court Act of 1980 to unify international trade
matters in a single, expert court.97 It pointed out, however, that
the district courts still have jurisdiction under section 526(c)
over suits between private parties for private enforcement or
damages for violation of section 526.98 Thus, the possibility of
conflicting results and forum shopping remained open."
93. Id. at 906-07.
94. Id at 907. See supra note 11.
95. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 907.
96. Id. The Olympus court took a different approach, but also denied the CIT
jurisdiction. Quantitative restrictions, as meant by this section, apply to "numerical
import restrictions such as those imposed by quotas." Olympus Corp. v. United States,
792 F.2d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 1986). See American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v.
United Statcs, 751 F.2d 1239, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (suit to challenge import quotas
under § 1581(i)(3) properly brought in CIT). The court opined that it "[did] not
think" that a quantitative restriction of zero was what Congress had in mind when it
passed § 1581(i)(3). 792 F.2d at 319. Addressing the argument that § 526 was an "em-
bargo," the court disputed so broad a use for that term, despite the use of the word in
the debate on passage of § 526 in 1922. See supra note 80. "ro treat section 526 as an
'embargo' would be to give that term a construction far broader than its ordinary
meaning without any indication of such congressional intent." Olympus, 792 F.2d at
319.
97. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 907. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 19-20
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3729, 3731.
98. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 907.
99. See id. at 907. The Customs Act of 1980 does not provide jurisdiction for suits
between two or more private individuals. Thus, suits to force the re-exporting, de-
struction, removal or obliteration of merchandise bearing a protected trademark must
be brought in any district court, with the likely result of conflicting decisions and
forum shopping on international trade matters. Preventing conflicting decisions and
forum shopping was a major goal of the 1980 act. See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., at 19-20 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3729,
3731.
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II
The Supreme Court Decision in
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.
On March 7, 1988, the Supreme Court handed down a deci-
sion on the jurisdictional issue,"oe and returned the case to the
calendar for reargument on the merits. The Court split 5-3 on
the question of jurisdiction.1' 1 Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, held that section 526 was not an embargo within the
normal use of that term.10 2 In addition, he rejected the "corol-
lary" to protest rationale suggested in Vivitar.03 Justice
Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, questioned
the majority's definition of embargo. The plain meaning of the
term showed an intent to give the CIT jurisdiction over any
governmentally imposed prohibition on importation.' 4
A. The Court Rejects the Rationale of the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals
Justice Brennan, in analyzing the jurisdictional issue, first
reviewed the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals' de-
nial of 47th Street Photo's motion to dismiss 03 While agreeing
with the result, Justice Brennan rejected the lower court's ar-
gument. Citing to common definitions of the term "embargo,"
he found no justification for limiting the term's meaning to
trade policy. "[Tirade policy is not the sole, nor perhaps even
the primary, purpose served by embargoes,"'' 6 he stated, ad-
ding that Congress had not expressly intended such a limita-
100. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 950 (1988).
101. K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 954.
102. Id, at 959.
103. 1d at 960. See supra notes 41-54, 76-79 and accompanying text.
104. K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 960-62 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
105. Id. at 956-57.
106. Id. at 956.
The Government typically imposes embargoes to protect public health, see,
e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 381 (adulterated, misbranded, or unapproved foods, drugs,
and cosmetics); safety, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1397 (motor vehicles that do not
conform to federal safety standards); morality, see, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (ob-
scene pictures, lottery tickets, and articles for causing unlawful abortion); or
to further interests relating to foreign affairs, see, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)
(embargo on Cuba); law enforcement, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1241-44 (switch-
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tion.10 7 In fact, if such a meaning had been intended, the
limitations that Congress imposed on jurisdiction under sec-
tions 1581(i)(3) and (j) would have been unnecessary." s
B. Section 526 is not an Embargo Within the Common Meaning
of the Term
The Court decided that the term "embargo" meant "a gov-
ernmentally imposed quantitative restriction--of zero--on the
importation of merchandise."' 9 This definition followed from
the "ordinary meaning" of the word, and "the meaning that
Congress apparently adopted in the statutory language."" 0
Thus, an importation prohibition that is not set or controlled by
the government is not an embargo.'l
1
The Court found that section 526 is not a governmental re-
striction, but an aid available to private parties to help them
enforce a private right:
[Section 526] merely provides a mechanism by which a private
party might, at its own option, enlist the Government's aid in
restricting the quantity of imports in order to enforce a private
right .... The private party, not the Government, by deciding
whether and how to exercise its private right, determines the
quantity of any particular product that can be imported.
112
The Court observed that inclusion of section 526 within the
meaning of "embargo" would "distort the term 'embargo' be-
yond its ordinary meaning...."113 In support of this argument,
the Court suggested that there are similar governmental aids
which clearly are not considered embargoes. An injunction en-
forcing an importation prohibition clause, for example, is a gov-
ernmentally imposed prohibition on importation, used at the
request of a private party who seeks to enforce a private
right.
114
The Court declared that, like an injunction, section 526
grants a trademark owner the exclusive right to exclude im-
107. Id. at 957.
108. Id. See supra note 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(j) states: "The Court of International
Trade shall not have jurisdiction of any civil action arising under section 305 of the
Tariff Act of 1930."
109. K Mart Corp, 108 S. Ct. at 957. See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d
315, 318 (2d Cir. 1986).
110. K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 957.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 958.
114. Id. at 957.
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ports of foreign-made goods bearing the owner's duly registered
trademark. The Government can neither set any limits, nor
control such imports."5
The Court challenged Justice Scalia's definition of embargo
as "any governmental 'import regulation that takes the form of
a prohibition, regardless of... its ultimate purpose.' "118 The
majority argued such a meaning would include not only the in-
junction scenario, but also other import regulations that re-
quire import licenses, tags, or inspections before acceptance by
the Customs officials." 7
The Court found no inconsistency between its reading of the
statute and the express Congressional intent to clarify and
unify the CIT's jurisdiction."" In fact, the Court pointed out
that, prior to the enactment of the Customs Courts Act of 1980,
legislation was proposed twice to make a sweeping jurisdic-
tional grant to the CIT." 9 According to the Court, the rejection
of these broader grants, and the adoption of the more specific
grant, showed an intent to constrain the CIT's jurisdiction:
"Congress opted for a scheme that achieved the desired goals of
uniformity and clarity by delineating precisely the particular
customs-related matters over which the [CIT] would have ex-
clusive jurisdiction. ' '12° The Court suggested that even the
115. Id. at 957-8.
116. 1d at 958 (emphasis in original).
117. Md The Court used 19 C.F.R. § 12.7(a) and (b), and § 12.8 as examples. Section
12.7(a) requires a valid permit before milk or cream can be imported. 19 C.F.R.
§ 12.7(a) (1985). Section 12.7(b) requires that a tag with certain specified information
be attached to any container of imported milk or cream. I& at § 12.7(b). Section 12.8
requires that all imported meat be inspected prior to entry. Id. at § 12.8.
118. K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 958. See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 47
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3729, 3759.
119. K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 958-59. In S. 2857, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), the
CIT would have "exclusive jurisdiction... over all civil actions against the [Govern-
ment] directly affecting imports.... ." In 1979, S. 1654 proposed that the CIT's juris-
diction would encompass "all civil actions against the [Government] which arise
directly from import transactions and which arise under the Tariff Act of 1930 ....
S. 1654, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See also H.R. 6394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
120. KMart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 959. As a result the CIT has jurisdiction over suits
involving import related tariffs, duties, fees and taxes as long as they were not im-
posed for the purpose of raising revenue. The Court also points out that the CIT does
not have:
direct review ... of facial challenges to conditions of entry, such as labeling or
marking requirements, see, e.g., 19 C.F.R. §§ 11.6-11.7 (1987) (packaging and
marking of distilled spirits, wines, and malt liquors); §§ 11.12-11.12b (labeling
of wool, fur, and textile products), and inspection, see, e.g., [19 C.F.R.] § 11.1
(inspection of cigars, cigarettes, medicinal preparations, and perfumery);
§ 12.8 (inspection of meats).
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choice of wording as to embargoes in contrast to importation
prohibitions showed an intent not to restrict CIT jurisdiction to
embargoes exclusively. 21
The Court readily admitted that there is little reason for the
exclusions. Yet, it did not believe that these omissions were in-
consistent with Congress' intent to utilize the expertise of the
Customs Courts and the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, since these courts did not have, and Congress
did not expect them to develop, such expertise. 122 The Court
concluded that the purpose and legislative history of the 1980
act supported its definition of the term "embargo."'
III
Jurisdiction Appropriately Lies in the Court of
International Trade
Since the CIT's jurisdictional grant is exclusive of the district
courts, this trademark issue must fall explicitly within one of
the statutes that grant the CIT exclusive jurisdiction. In K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., it should fall within section 1581(a)
or (i) of Title 28, which grants jurisdiction to the CIT in civil
actions against the United States.
A. Section 1581(i)(3)
The Supreme Court should have found that section 1581(i)(3)
provides a basis for jurisdiction in this case. Under section
1581(i)(3) the "Court of International Trade shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the
United States... that arises out of any law of the United States
providing for.., embargoes or other quantitative restrictions
.... 124 Does section 526 of the Tariff Act qualify as an em-
bargo or other quantitative restriction?
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, one of the draft-
ers of section 526, Senator Kellogg, used the word "embargo" in
the Congressional Record when referring to that section.12
Id Lastly, the Court refers to the explicit exclusion made in § 1581(i)(3) for embar-
goes or other quantitative restrictions concerning the protection of public health or
safety.
121. K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 959.
122. Id.
123. I&
124. 28 U.S.C. § 158i(i)(3) (1980). See supra note 11.
125. K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 961. See supra note 80.
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While the Second Circuit, in Olympus, gave little weight to
this,' it is at least an indication that section 526 could be con-
sidered an embargo within that term's meaning.'
More persuasively, the overall intent and structure of section
1581(i) points to a broad reading of that section.1' The primary
purpose of section 1581 is to ensure that civil cases involving
international trade where the United States is a party should
be brought before the CIT.'2
Subsections (a)-(h) list the major jurisdictional grants that
the framers desired to give the CIT.13° In subsection (i), it is
evident that the framers sought to provide a residual basis to
provide jurisdiction for the complaints that properly involve in-
ternational trade and the United States government, but "[fall]
through the cracks" of subsections (a)-(h):
Simply put, subsection (i) is the embodiment of the principle
that if a cause of action involving an import transaction exists,
other than as provided for in subsections (a)-(h) of proposed
section 1581, then that cause of action should be instituted in
the U.S. Court of International Trade rather than the Federal
district courts or courts of appeals."3'
A proper reading of subsection (i) suggests that it is intended
to cover each method by which government involves itself in
an international trade transaction. First, (i)(1) relates to all
revenue gathered by the government from imports or ton-
nage. 32 Second, the wording in (i)(2) covers all other reasons
for monetary payments, other than those relating to the raising
of revenue. 3 Third, with "embargoes or other quantitative re-
striction," in (i)(3), the government can either bar or restrict
the volume of entries into the country.'4 In (i)(4), finally, the
government can have an impact on an international trade
transaction through administrative and enforcement proce-
126. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 1986).
127. Id. at 319.
128. See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 33 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3729, 3745. See also United States v. Uniroyal Inc.,
687 F.2d 467, 475 (Fed. Cir. 1982). Contra COPIAT, 790 F.2d 903,907 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
129. See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 33 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3729, 3745.
130. Id. at 43-48, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3755-60.
131. 126 CONG. REC. H.26,554 (daily ed. Sept 22, 1980) (Statement of Rep. Rodino).
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dures involving subsections (i)(1)-(3) or subsections (a)-(h).135
Section 526 falls into subsection (i)(3). While the Supreme
Court and other courts have rejected a broad reading of section
526 to include it in the embargo category,136 this is not required.
The broad reading of section 1581(i), as suggested above, shows
that dividing the phrase "embargoes and other quantitative re-
strictions," and analyzing section 526 as either an embargo or a
quantitative restriction is unnecessary and erroneous. The pur-
pose of subsection (i)(3) is to include in the CIT's grant of juris-
diction the full range of volume restrictions that the
government may impose. The words "[e]mbargoes and other
quantitative restrictions," when read together, show the spec-
trum of volume restrictions available to the government.'3
An embargo is a "[g]overnment order prohibiting commercial
trade with individuals or businesses of other nations.""s It is a
bar to entry. "Other quantitative restrictions" are also volume
restrictions. They include all other governmentally imposed
import restrictions that do not come within the meaning of
"embargo."'" Section 526 makes it unlawful to import foreign
manufactured merchandise bearing a genuine trademark, reg-
istered and owned by an American citizen or entity.14° It, too, is
a bar to entry.'
4 1
The intent of the framers of the Customs Act of 1980 should
control because that intent is unambiguous. "Tihe purpose of
this broad jurisdictional grant is to eliminate the confusion
which currently exists as to the demarcation between the juris-
diction of the district courts and the [CIT]. This provision
makes it clear that all suits of the type specified are properly
commenced only in the [CIT]."'142 Section 1581 specifies that
135. Id.
136. See K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 957-59; COPIAT, 790 F.2d 903, 907 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Olympus, 792 F.2d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 1986).
137. COPLAT, 790 F.2d at 907. "(S]ubsection (i)(3) covers restrictions on the quan-
tity of imports." Id (emphasis in original).
138. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 468 (5th ed. 1979).
139. But see Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 1419, 1426 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984).
140. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 961 (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("Surely § 526(a)
prohibits imports, and that prohibition, enacted by Congress and enforced by an exec-
utive agency, is surely governmentally imposed.").
142. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 47 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3729, 3759.
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suits where the Government is a party properly belong in the
CIT.
The Supreme Court argued that the ability of private parties
to invoke section 526 in order to protect a private right runs
contrary to the "ordinary meaning" of "embargoes. ' ' 14 This ar-
gument again presumes that the phrase "embargoes or other
quantitative restrictions" is to be read narrowly and separately.
The purpose of the subsection is to insure that any sort of re-
striction of volume imposed by the government, provided it
does not relate to public health, is to be heard by the CIT.'"
The Court analogized section 526 to an injunction that pre-
vents importation in violation of an importation clause. 45 It ar-
gued that section 526, in all aspects, more clearly resembles this
type of an injunction than an embargo."" The Court implied
that an injunction is not, and could not be, an embargo.'.
The dissent attacked this injunction analogy, arguing that an
injunction is not an embargo, not because private parties are
involved, but because embargoes are generally associated with
legislative or executive actions and not judicial actions.
148
The suggested broad reading of section 1581(i)(3) eliminates
the majority's distinction between injunctions and embargoes.
Assume, for example, that in the majority's injunction scenario,
the private party who sued and received this injunction accused
the Customs Service of improperly enforcing it. In this case,
the private party would clearly go to the CIT. While the in-
junction does not qualify as an embargo,"49 it falls within the
"other quantitative restrictions" segment of this section. It is a
restriction on importation imposed by the government, and is,
therefore, a type of action to which the CIT can apply its exper-
tise, ensuring a consistent result."w
143. K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 958.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) (1980). See Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1426.
145. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
146. K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 957-58.
147. Id at 957. "Yet one could no more deem the private party's enforcement of its
'importation prohibition' an 'embargo' than deem damages for its breach a 'tarif[f],
dut[y], fe[e] or other ta[x] on the importation of merchandise,' 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(2)."
Il
148. Id at 962 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. I& at 957.
150. H.R. REP. No. 1235,96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 29-30 (1980), reprintd in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEWS 3729, 3741.
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B. Section 1581(a) and Section 1581(i)(4)
The Court, in examining the proposed "corollary" to protest
jurisdiction as put forth in Vivitar, adopted the reasoning of
the court of appeals in COPIAT:' "' "Since this suit involves no
'protest,' much less a denial of one, it cannot by any stretch of
the imagination involve a 'law... providing for... administra-
tion and enforcement' of a protest."'52
The Court correctly interpreted the plain meaning of the
statute, but did not elaborate on its rejection of the "corollary"
to protest jurisdiction. Further analysis explains the inherent
logical flaw of the Vivitar decisions.
Section 1581(a) gives the CIT exclusive jurisdiction over par-
ties contesting denial of protests under section 1515 of the
Tariff Act.15' In order to lodge a protest, a party must have
imported merchandise, and it must have been excluded from
entry or delivery.--
In Olympus Corp. v. United States, the court had suggested
that "[s]ection 1514, which outlines the circumstances under
which a protest may be made, makes no provision for a protest
where the Customs Service refuses to exclude merchandise; it
permits the filing of a protest only when exclusion of merchan-
dise takes place under a provision of the customs law."'5 5 The
Supreme Court decided that since a protest was not and could
not be filed, section 1581(a) will not provide a basis for CIT ju-
risdiction in this case.'-"
The Vivitar courts, however, found jurisdiction by combin-
ing section 1581(a) and (i)(4), calling the combination a "corol-
lary to protest jurisdiction.' 1 57 The court reasoned that the
corollary is a natural progression of sections 1514, 1515, 1581(a)
and 1581(i)(4); moreover, since a party to an importation is per-
mitted to protest the exclusion of his merchandise under any
provision of customs laws, if that protest is denied by a Customs
151. K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 959-60. See supra notes 41-54, 76-79 and accompany-
ing text.
152. K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 960 (quoting Olympus, 792 F.2d at 318).
153. Id. at 959. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1980). See supra note 36.
154. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(4) (1984). See supra note 36.
155. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 318 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis in
original), cited with approval in K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 960.
156. K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 960.
157. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 1419,1424-26 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984);
Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1560 (Fed Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474
U.S. 1055 (1986).
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officer,"~ it follows that, in an appeal, a non-importing party,
likely to be injured by such an import, should be allowed to pro-
test the failure to exclude an import (an issue of administration
and enforcement of the subject matter of section 1514), 111 and
denial of such a protest gives the court jurisdiction.160
The Vivitar courts contended that section 1581(i)(4) was a
grant of a "residual independent jurisdictional basis for litigat-
ing Customs Service administration and enforcement of the
substantive matter that may be the subject of a protest, but
where a protest remedy is inappropriate or unavailable.""'1 .
1. The Plain Meaning of Section 1581 Does Not Allow For
a "Corollary to ProtestJurisdiction"
The CIT's grant of jurisdiction is exclusive of the district
courts. As such, it carves out its subject matter from the broad
residual jurisdiction of the district courts.16 2 Therefore, the
grant of jurisdiction must be clear and well defined. What does
not fall within the explicit jurisdictional grounds of the CIT
must fall within the domain of the district courts."a Section
1514 is explicit not only on what matters are subject to protest,
but also on who is entitled to lodge a protest.164 The plaintiffs
in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. do not qualify in either
category.
Section 1581(i)(4), too, is explicit. Only matters of "adminis-
tration and enforcement" are granted jurisdiction by this sub-
section." It is illogical that failure to qualify for jurisdiction
under protest clauses enables a party to qualify under adminis-
tration and enforcement of the protest clause just because the
protest remedy is inappropriate or unavailable. In that case, if
the issue is not one of administration and enforcement, jurisdic-
tion is in the district courts, not the CIT. As the CIT in Olym-
pus observed:
[Tihis action does not arise out of the "administration and en-
forcement" of protests simply because it tangentially relates to
the protest procedure. We think that section 1581(i)(4) prop-
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). See supra note 36.
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4). See supra note 11.
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). See supra note 36.
161. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1426.
162. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1560.
163. K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 956.
164. 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1984). See supra note 40.
165. See supra note 11.
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erly gives the CIT jurisdiction only of those matters that arise
from protests themselves, not of all issues that conceivably
could arise in a protest action under a hypothetical fact
situation.166
The CIT expressed concern in Vivitar that denying their
reading of section 1581(i)(4) would render it meaningless. 167
This, the COPIAT appellate court observed, is incorrect:
"[W]hereas Section 1581(a) only provides for jurisdiction over
cases contesting the denial of a protest-in other words, chal-
lenging the basis of the denial--Section 1581(i)(4) (as applied to
Section 1581(a)) provides additional jurisdiction over cases
challenging the procedures-that is, the 'administration and en-
forcement'-generally governing such protests."'6
The words "administration and enforcement," in ordinary
meaning, apply to issues of procedural management and imple-
mentation of the subject matters of section 1581(a)-(h) and
(i)(1)-(3). If the Customs Service does not properly follow ad-
ministrative procedures or does not enforce the law, then (i)(4)
gives the CIT jurisdiction over those administrative or enforce-
ment matters. 69
Conclusion
This Note both concurs with and disputes the Supreme
Court's decision in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. The Court
properly decided that straight protest jurisdiction was not
available to the plaintiff. With respect to the "corollary to pro-
test jurisdiction," the Court also correctly decided against juris-
diction, since, without a legal protest, there can be no
administration and enforcement issue.
This Note suggests, however, that a proper analysis of section
1581(1)(3) should have precluded a finding of jurisdiction in the
district court and led to dismissal of the case. Given the express
intent of Congress, and the structure of section 1581, it is clear
that subsection 1581(i) should be read broadly to include sec-
166. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 318.
167. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1426.
168. COPLAT, 790 F.2d at 906 (emphasis in original).
169. For instance, § 1514(c) describes the form, number and amendment of protests
and filing of protests. If a Customs Service officer failed to recognize an importer's
right to amend his protest, then under § 1581(i)(4) that importer would have CIT ju-
risdiction to hear that complaint. On the other hand, § 1581(a) would not provide
such a basis, since it applies to the basis of denial of a protest. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)
(1984).
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tion 526 within the scope of the phrase "embargoes and other
quantitative restrictions."
Dismissal would have meant, to the litigants' dismay, that the
substantive matters in COPIA T would not have been decided by
the Supreme Court. The decision reached there, however, may
well cause more problems in the future for those practicing in
the international trade field. As Justice Scalia observed, "the
jurisdictional question, if decided incorrectly, may generate un-
certainty and hence litigation into the indefinite future." '70
With the decision in K Mart Corp., "[i]t remains to be seen what
other limitations on the ordinary meaning of 'embargo,' no
more apparent to the naked mind than the present one, may
exist."
,1 71
170. K Mart Cop., 108 S. Ct. at 960 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
171. Id at 962.
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